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Abstract:  
A dynamic computable general equilibrium model based on the PEP standard model 
developed by Decaluwé et al. (2009) is used to evaluate the impacts of the international 
crisis on the South African economy. However, we have changed some assumptions in 
order to better represent South African specificities. A major innovation in this regard is 
the modelling of unemployment and the influence of labour unions on the labour market. 
Two scenarios encompassing a severe and moderate recession are run. The effects of 
the crisis on the economy are really quite harsh, even in the moderate recession 
scenario, both in the short run and the long run. Indeed, the decrease of world prices 
combined with the drop of world demand lead to a decrease in production for many 
sectors with consequent laying off of workers. The impact on institutions is also 
worrying: agents see their income as well as their savings decreasing. The huge drop in 
firms’ savings has a dire impact on total investment while the huge negative impact on 
government accounts of protracted slow global growth imply tight public budgets for 
some time to come. Thus, some gains made by the government prior to the crisis may 
have been reversed by the economic crisis. It is apparent from the results that the 
impact of the crisis will drag into the long run with the situation still below what it would 
have been in the absence of a crisis until 2015. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The United States of America subprime mortgage crisis which began in August 2007 
degenerated into a full-scale global financial crisis between August and October. 
Commentators have referred to this crisis as the worst the world has witnessed in the last 80 
years
8
. The crisis has resulted in significant asset depreciation, closures of companies, rising 
unemployment and a sharp slowing down of economic growth, with most highly 
industrialised countries entering a recession.  
 
After a lag, the crisis has now begun to be felt by South Africa. The country has especially 
been affected by the sharp fall in demand for its export products, the fall in prices of key 
export commodities and falling foreign investment. The economy has recently been plunged 
into a recession for the first time in 17 years and its macroeconomic forecasts have had to 
be revised downwards substantially. The declining growth has potentially negative 
implications for incomes, employment, and investment; and on social programmes partly 
through the slowdown’s effect on tax revenues for government. This document uses a 
dynamic computable general equilibrium model (CGEM) to analyse the impact of the 
financial and economic crisis on South Africa.  
 
The remainder of the document is divided into six sections. Section 2 describes the general 
impacts of the crisis in South Africa while section 3 discusses the scenarios and likely impacts 
for South Africa as well as recent macroeconomic policy responses to the crisis. Section 4 
describes the data used for the model while section 5 discusses the model. Section 6 reports 
and discusses results of various simulations and section 7 concludes.  
                                                           
8
 See for example, IMF 2008 
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2. Impacts on the economy 
 
Until recently, the economic performance of post apartheid South Africa has been relatively 
impressive, averaging 3.3% growth rate for real gross domestic product (GDP) and 1.4% in 
per capita terms for the period 1995 to 2005. This growth trend was an improvement, if one 
compares with the rates of the 1985 to 1994 period, where the respective average rates 
were 0.8 and –1.3% (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: GDP and GDP per capita growth rates (constant 2000 prices) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database (www.reservebank.co.za). 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had to downgrade its forecasts for economic growth 
in advanced economies quite dramatically. Whereas previously, consensus forecasts had 
been looking towards growth in GDP for 2009 and 2010 in the United States, Eurozone and 
Japan of around 1.5%, new forecasts by the IMF see growth in the United States falling from 
1.6% in 2009 to just 0.1% in 2010. Similarly, a decline from 1.3% in 2009 to just 0.2% in 2010 
is forecast in the Eurozone and in Japan down from 0.7% in 2009 to 0.5% in 2010. To the 
extent that South Africa's historical economic growth rate has been very closely linked to 
that of the world economy since 1993/94, such downward revisions in the forecasts of these 
major economies imply that one must similarly look for reduced domestic growth in the 
economy. Indeed, South Africa's economic growth rate has recently fallen to its lowest level 
in five years in terms of year on year basis and in 10 years on quarter on quarter annualised 
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basis in the first quarter of 2009. Bearing in mind the closeness of the correlation between 
domestic economic growth and that of the global economy, this slowdown in economic 
growth should come as no surprise. 
 
A visible effect of the crisis has been declines in several commodity prices since their peaks 
around July 2008. Most dramatic of all have been the decline, of around 60%, in the prices of 
platinum group metals (PGMs) as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Commodity prices per Oz/per bbl  
 
 2007 2008 (YTD) Current (May 2009) 
 $ price 
Rand 
Price $ price Rand Price $ price Rand Price 
Gold 697 4900 895 6918 916 8519 
Platinum 1304 9167 1772 13698 998 9281 
Palladium 353 2482 393 3038 196 1823 
Rhodium 6113 42974 7550 58362 3250 30225 
Oil 72.7 511 111.2 860 78.3 728 
Source: Econometrix (2008) 
 
Table 2 illustrates the magnitude of the decline in exports of precious metals and the decline 
in the value of oil imports on an annualised basis. It can be seen that there has been a 
decline in exports of precious metals of some R13.0bn compared with 2007 and by R37.4bn 
compared with the average export revenue achieved in the year to date in 2008.   
Table 2: Value of Annualised Mineral Imports/Exports (R’bn) 
 
 2007 Annualised 2008 (YTD) Annualised Current 
Gold 39.9 46.9 48 
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Platinum 46.2 58.6 39.7 
Palladium 6.9 7.2 4.3 
Rhodium 26.9 34.6 17.9 
PGMs 83 100.4 61.9 
Oil 109.8 153 129.5 
Source: Econometrix (2008) 
 
Table 3: Change in Annualised Mineral/Exports (R’bn)    
 
Exports Current vs 2007 Avg Current vs 2008 Avg 
Gold +8.1 +1.1 
Platinum -6.5 -18.9 
Palladium -2.6 -2.9 
Rhodium -12 -16.7 
PGMs -21.1 -38.5 
Oil -13 -37.4 
Imports   
Oil -19.7 -23.5 
Balance +6.7 -13.9 
Source: Econometrix (2008) 
 
One needs to also take into account declines in export values of minerals other than 
precious metals. In particular, coal prices have declined by some 30% in recent months, not 
to mention the 50% decline in the price of copper from its peak in July. One could therefore 
be looking at a further R10bn decline in the value of mineral exports in relation to the 
average for this year as a whole. The net effect at present, of lower commodity prices, would 
be to contribute to the widening of South Africa's trade deficit by around R15bn to R25bn on 
an annualised basis compared with the situation which prevailed when commodity prices 
were at their peaks in July 2008. This is not a dramatic deterioration in the trade account 
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and is relatively small in relation to the services account of the current account of the 
balance of payments. 
 
South Africa has a current account of the balance of payments (exports minus imports of 
goods and services as well as transfers) deficit equal to between 7.5% and 9% of GDP. The 
country does not have substantial foreign exchange reserves to finance that deficit, and 
therefore relies on capital inflows. But if these turn to outflows as a result of the financial 
crisis, the Rand will be under enormous pressure, and will lose value rapidly in world 
markets. This will mean that, the world financial crisis will likely impact more heavily on 
South Africa in terms of its wide economic effects than it will via the exposure of its financial 
markets to the melting fortunes of foreign financial firms. 
 
Since the onset of the steep decline in global and domestic economic growth, one has been 
wary of the possibility of a huge shortfall in government revenue and an associated 
substantial expansion in the fiscal deficit. In the month of April 2009 specifically, which 
represents the first month of the 2009/10 fiscal year, such fears were amplified as shown in 
Table 4. Year on year growth in government revenue was heavily negative at -10.6%, whilst 
conversely, growth in government expenditure soared to 50.2%. The resultant fiscal deficit 
for April of -R37.4bn, was much greater than the corresponding -R13.9bn deficit recorded in 
April of 2008. Extrapolation of April's growth in government revenue and expenditure to an 
entire fiscal year would lead to revenue of just R543.9bn, but expenditure of R954.7bn, 
leaving a phenomenal fiscal deficit for the full year of -R410.9bn or 16.6% of GDP. It is 
insightful to note that whereas the growth in direct tax revenues (personal tax and company 
tax) in April held up quite well compared with the full-year budget, growth in revenue from 
indirect taxes such as VAT, excise duties, the fuel levy and international trade, was 
dramatically down on the full-year budget. Since these are indicators of expenditure 
patterns, this is an indication of the depth of the economic downturn in respect of spending 
patterns. 
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Table 4 : Government finances: Growth in Revenue and Expenditure (%change) 
April 2009 
 
Source: Econometrix (2009) 
 
3. Scenarios for South Africa and likely impacts 
 
When attempting to estimate the likely impact on specific segments of the population of 
South Africa, one needs to generate scenarios based on the anticipated level of severity of 
the global downturn, as well as its duration. Two such scenarios, namely a severe recession 
scenario and a medium recession scenario are sketched here to act as a guideline in thinking 
about the impact that the crisis may have on the economy.  
 
2007/08 2008/09 2008/09 2009/10 
Personal Tax 21.7 19.9 15.6 4.2 
Companies 24.6 18.8 18.0 -1.2 
STC 27.2 32.1 -2.8 -5.0 
Property Tax n/a 22.7 -20.3 7.3 
VAT 11.2 9.3 2.3 9.0 
Excise Duties 12.3 11.1 7.0 9.9 
Fuel Levy 8.0 9.9 4.8 22.9 
International Trade 11.6 12.5 -14.6 3.8 
Revenue 16.8 12.8 8.7 5.0 
Expenditure 14.0 11.4 17.4 15.7 
Fiscal Surplus/(Deficit) Rbn 19.5 14.3 (27.3) (94.0) 
Borrowing Requirement Rbn 20.6 15.1 (23.4) (90.4) 
 
Actual Budget Budget Actual 
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In the severe recession scenario, G7 economies see the liquidity crisis spill over from their 
financial sectors as a result of their consumers suffering from a negative wealth effect 
brought about by falling asset prices (equities, homes, etc.). The loss of previously imagined 
wealth, including the impacts that those now falling asset prices might have on pension 
funds, could cause consumers in the G7 countries to cut back heavily on their demands for 
both goods and credit. This would lead to both lower demand for domestically produced 
goods in those economies, and for imported goods produced by other economies both 
within the G7 group, and within developing nations supplying raw materials and 
intermediate goods. This kind of development could become a downward spiral for both 
demand and supply, as lower demand for goods would lead to the supply side cutting back 
on its resource requirements, with job losses. The potential depth of the ensuing recession, 
or even depression if prices in those economies as well as outputs begin to drop beyond the 
initial asset categories affected so far, is likely to be proportionally linked to the length of 
time that the recession/depression would last. The deeper the production loss at any point 
in time, the longer the recession could be expected to remain in place. If the loss of 
production is severe, as imagined in this scenario, it could last for years, rather than quarters 
of a year. 
 
The medium recession scenario sees the loss of asset values being constrained to a level 
perhaps 10% to 20% below where they stood on 10
th
 October 2007. While this will have a 
sufficiently large effect on G7 economies to be very noticeable in terms of negative growth 
on both the demand and supply sides of their economies, growth for the group as a whole 
would remain in a band between 0% and -1% during 2009, after which it could be expected 
to slowly and gently recover. Inflation is likely to be higher in this than the severe recession 
scenario, because more liquidity would surely have to be injected into those economies to 
soften the scale and duration of the downturn. 
 
Now what would be the likely impact of severe G7 recession scenario on South Africa? For 
the financial side of the South African economy, this scenario could be devastating. 
Foreigners would be forced to withdraw huge amounts of capital currently residing in the SA 
financial economy, resulting in sales of equities, property, government and parastatal bonds, 
and a simultaneous weakening of the exchange rate as the funds are expatriated to the 
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home economies of the sellers, where they would be needed to increase liquidity. The Rand 
would tumble sharply on world forex markets, leading to a rapid and very sharp and 
sustained weakening of the exchange rate. Eventually, this would redress the current 
account imbalance through lower imports, but it could also kill off the recently rapidly 
escalating fixed investment plans of government and parastatals, forcing them to cancel 
currently intended capacity expansion projects (eg. Eskom, Transnet). These projects are 
mainly responsible for the growth rate of production in the South African economy having 
remained firmly positive so far during 2008 and if they are threatened during and beyond 
2009, domestic production growth in South Africa could crumble, detracting from 
employment and earning prospects in this country. Even the possibility of falling prices in G7 
countries would probably not be sufficient to bring down the prices of imported goods, 
because of the severe weakness of the Rand in this scenario. The only ray of light would then 
be the continuing positive growth in commodity demand from China and India, 
remembering that commodities do dominate South Africa’s export basket.   
 
Finally, what about the impact of medium G7 recession scenario on the South African 
economy? Obviously, the impacts of a less severe G7 downturn, which would also not last 
for several years as is imagined in the severe scenario, would be less harsh for the South 
African economy. The Rand would not fall to the same extent, or for as extended a period, 
but there certainly would be damage to the economy from more expensive imported 
materials, many of which are required for the infrastructural expansion programs recently 
begun. Inflation would remain high for longer than it would have if the G7 had not entered 
recessionary conditions, mainly because of the weakness of the Rand exchange rate. This 
will dissipate real spending power within South Africa, depleting the real level of demand for 
goods and services even if the economy does not enter a period of negative employment 
and production growth. As above, the China and India demand factor could assist South 
Africa as a major commodity producer and a lack of capital in global markets could act to 
prevent other commodity producers in Africa and the rest of the world from developing the 
necessary infrastructure to get commodities to distant ports in order to export them to 
China and India. Nevertheless, South Africa’s higher value added (i.e. manufactured) exports, 
mainly destined for the weak G7 economies, would doubtlessly suffer more than the 
dominant commodity exports, and the loss of export value and GDP could be disproportional 
to the loss of export volumes.   
10 
 
 
Neither of the above scenarios is particularly favourable for the South African economy, 
because of its exposure to global market conditions. It might be protected or insulated in 
certain aspects, and for various lengths of time under differing global shrinkage scenarios. 
The national response to the global crisis has come in 5 different forms (see 
Nedlac/Presidency (2009)). First the government has announced a major public investments 
programme of approximately R787bn over the three financial years to March 2012. This 
public investment programme will include expanding and improving the road and rail 
networks, public transport, and port operations, dams, water and sanitation infrastructure, 
housing construction including low-income housing and publicly owned rental stock, 
information and communications technology and energy generation capacity as well as 
education and health infrastructure. Related to this, South Africa is set to host the 2010 
Soccer World Cup. The build up to this event has already initiated a multitude of fixed 
investment projects, including the building of new stadia, massive improvements to the 
country's airport facilities, and the upgrading of the country's transport and road network, 
urgency in the drive to increase electricity generating capacity, further investments in 
telecommunications, rail and harbor facilities. These investment projects will have some way 
to go, with knock-on benefits in terms of generating additional business opportunities for 
the private sector. Even though funding of such huge projects is likely to prove a constraint 
of sorts, the economy finds itself in a healthy fiscal situation in being able to countenance 
running into a significant fiscal deficit seeing that the fiscal balance has been in surplus for a 
number of years and the public debt has declined to below 25% of GDP. However, the 
principal constraint lies not so much with government borrowing but with access to foreign 
borrowings and foreign exchange in order to fund the high level of imports of capital 
equipment. 
 
Second, the macroeconomic policy response to the crisis has come in the form of counter-
cyclical (expansionary) fiscal policy, reduction in nominal interest rates, and competitive 
exchange rates. Third, industrial and trade policy response has come in the form of rescue 
packages for vulnerable sectors (clothing, textile). There has also been support for small and 
medium enterprises in crisis as well as tightening of import controls. Fourth, employment 
measures have included the expanded public works programme and training and skills 
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development. Fifth, social measures include industrial level social plans, improved 
unemployment insurance fund benefits, emergency food relief, access to free basic services, 
social grants and support for community food production. 
 
4. Data description 
 SAM: 
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is based on the 2005 Supply and Use (SU) tables 
obtained from Stats SA and other national data sets from various sources such as the 
Reserve Bank. The SAM we are using has 54 activities and 54 commodities; two broad 
factors, labour and capital; 4 institutional sector accounts (households, enterprises, 
government and the rest of world); and 2 saving and investment accounts (change in 
inventories and GDFI).  
For the trade parameters, we use Gibson (2003), for the low-bound export supply while 
demand elasticities are obtained from Behar and Edwards (2004). To our knowledge, 
estimates for parameters in industries’ production and households’ demand are not 
available for South Africa. Therefore, our study borrows these values from the literature 
surveyed by Annabi et al. (2006). Finally, unemployment rates are drawn from the labour 
force survey report by Statistics South Africa (2005). 
Given our specific study, we present in Table 5 trade relations between South Africa and the 
rest of the world in 2005. It specifies the import penetration rate as well as the sectoral 
share of imports in total imports. Moreover, it details the sectoral export intensity rates 
measured as a share of exports in production in each sector and the share of each sector 
exports in total exports. 
Table 5 : Structure of the South African trade
9
 (%) 
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 Please note that this table only refers to tradable sectors, thus government’s activities are not 
represented. 
Sectors 
Exports 
Intensity rates, 
as a share of 
total sectoral 
production (%) 
Sectoral Exports 
shares as a portion of 
total exports (%) 
Imports 
penetration rates, 
as a share of total 
sectoral supply (%) 
Sectoral Imports 
shares as a portion of 
total imports (%) 
12 
 
 Agriculture, forestry 
& fishing  21,89 4,14 5,84 1,09 
 Coal mining  48,96 5,01 4,47 0,26 
 Gold & uranium ore 
mining  98,65 6,58 0,53 0,00 
 Other mining  50,65 12,82 30,55 11,08 
 Food  8,50 2,38 6,02 2,52 
 Beverages & 
tobacco  22,16 2,29 2,54 0,42 
 Textiles  16,58 0,70 14,40 1,15 
 Wearing apparel  12,89 0,54 11,41 1,27 
 Leather & leather 
products  35,87 0,44 17,45 0,26 
 Footwear  5,12 0,05 20,39 0,72 
 Wood & wood 
products  12,94 0,61 8,98 0,50 
 Paper & paper 
products  15,95 1,45 8,81 0,96 
 Printing, publishing 
& recorded media  4,89 0,22 14,78 1,10 
 Coke & refined 
petroleum products  17,39 2,59 5,34 1,30 
 Basic chemicals  30,81 4,60 21,66 4,32 
 Other chemicals & 
man-made fibres  11,54 2,09 12,53 3,95 
 Rubber products  23,54 0,48 22,56 0,91 
 Plastic products  5,54 0,36 9,13 0,73 
 Glass & glass 
products  11,56 0,19 12,64 0,29 
 Non-metallic 
minerals  7,71 0,46 11,18 0,87 
 Basic iron & steel  62,48 10,48 11,56 1,24 
 Basic non-ferrous 
metals  47,03 2,94 19,44 1,10 
 Metal products 
excluding machinery  19,02 1,79 13,88 1,66 
 Machinery & 
equipment  67,47 7,11 35,35 12,83 
 Electrical machinery  13,23 0,97 17,18 2,25 
 Television, radio & 
communication 
equipment  53,25 0,88 39,74 5,26 
 Professional & 
scientific equipment  84,86 0,90 30,42 2,40 
 Motor vehicles, 
parts & accessories  20,46 6,72 23,08 15,32 
 Other transport 
equipment  27,40 0,68 33,73 3,24 
 Furniture  48,87 1,71 9,48 0,56 
 Other industries  18,34 1,94 12,97 3,01 
 Electricity, gas & 
steam  0,96 0,11 0,02 0,00 
 Water supply  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
13 
 
Source: Own computations from SAM(2005) 
 
From the table above, we can point out that gold (98% of its production), Scientific 
equipment (84%) or Machinery and equipment (67%) heavily rely on exports. A decrease in 
world demand or in international prices for these commodities will thus have a huge effect. 
In the same way, some commodities depend on imports such as radio and equipment (39%), 
or other mining (30%). For these sectors, a decrease in international prices will strongly 
affect them, stimulating imports and increasing competition from foreign suppliers on 
domestic market. South Africa exports most of its mineral and precious metals, together 
representing 40.9% of total exports. An external shock on mineral prices would thus have 
strong effects on the economy. 
 Building the BAU: 
As we mentioned previously, our SAM is based on 2005 data. In that period, South Africa 
anticipated GDP growth rates of 4.5% per year. We simulate a Business As Usual (BAU) 
taking into account the expected rate of GDP growth. In order to reach this GDP, we add a 
total factor productivity parameter. Moreover, we had for 2005, investment by destination 
 Building 
construction  0,05 0,02 0,26 0,09 
 Wholesale & retail 
trade  1,21 1,01 0,06 0,05 
 Catering & 
accommodation 
services  21,33 1,45 22,81 2,49 
 Railway transport  15,39 0,58 9,16 0,35 
 Road transport  7,42 1,93 1,55 0,37 
 Transport via 
pipeline  16,04 0,04 0,00 0,00 
 Water transport  13,52 0,53 31,67 2,80 
 Air transport  20,37 0,65 32,11 2,18 
 Transport support 
services  9,87 0,80 12,74 1,21 
 Communication  7,01 2,21 6,13 2,00 
 Finance & insurance  6,26 0,61 9,71 1,40 
 Business services  3,90 4,61 1,70 1,97 
 Medical, dental & 
other health & 
veterinary services  0,60 0,11 1,01 0,20 
 Community, social & 
personal services  3,69 1,22 6,47 2,29 
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for all the sectors
10
, as well as depreciation rates by activities. Stats SA estimated that 
population will grow at a rate around 1%. Calibrating the BAU on these “real” data, we 
found that capital grows faster than labour, so in the BAU we have a decrease in 
unemployment. Moreover, as our production factors become more and more efficient, 
prices decrease also in the BAU. These pieces of information are important in order to 
understand the results. 
 
5. The modelling framework:  
To evaluate the impacts of the world economic crisis on South Africa, we use the dynamic 
Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP 1-t) standard model by Decaluwé et al (2009). However, 
we have changed several assumptions of this standard model in order to better take into 
account the South African economy. Our model has two production factors, capital and 
labour, but the latter is disaggregated into four types of labour: informal workers, unskilled, 
semi-skilled and highly skilled workers. Each activity uses both production factors. 
In line with the SAM, the model has 54 activities and commodities. The production function 
technology is assumed to be of constant returns to scale and is presented in a four-level 
production process. At the first level, output is a Leontief input-output of value added and 
intermediate consumption. At the second level, a CES function is used to represent the 
substitution between a composite labour and capital. At the third level, composite labour 
demand is also a CES function between composite-skilled and composite unskilled labour. 
Note that the composite skilled demand is a CES with a low elasticity between skilled and 
semi skilled workers, capturing the fact that it is quite difficult for the firms to substitute 
semi-skilled for skilled workers. On the other hand, we also use a CES to describe the 
composite unskilled labour demand between informal and unskilled workers. Here, we 
assume that for the producer, it is relatively easy to substitute them. Figure 2 gives the value 
added structure. 
Figure 2: The Value Added Structure: 
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 In most of dynamic CGE, this information is not available and we have to build a steady state (or 
regular path) to calibrate capital stock at the base year. 
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South Africa is faced with high unemployment problems, notably for semi-skilled and 
unskilled labour. Moreover, unions are very strong in the country. South Africa has the most 
disciplined as well as the largest trade union movement in Africa. The movement has been 
influential in policies on the labour market and other related industrial policies. They 
negotiate salaries and wages, conditions of service, workforce restructuring and 
retrenchments on behalf of their members. As a result, wages and salaries are strongly rigid 
downwards. To take this rigidity into account in our modeling, we assume that we have a 
minimum wage. Thus, if the production decreases, producers won’t be able to decrease 
their employees’ salary below the minimum wage. On the other hand, this rigidity will have 
an impact on unemployment: given that producers can’t decrease workers wage rate, they 
will have to retrench some of them. 
The nominal exchange rate is the numeraire in the model
11
. Following the assumption that 
South Africa is a small country, world prices are fixed. However we assume that S.A 
exporters face a less than infinite foreign demand equations for exports. In order to increase 
their market share on the world market they need to reduce their FOB prices for exports 
increasing their competiveness with respect to other suppliers on the international market. 
Factor supplies are fixed in the first period and then grow, at the population rate for labour 
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 Note that in the CGE results, a real devaluation of the Rand takes the form of a generalized reduction 
in domestic prices. 
Value Added 
Composite Labour Capital 
Composite Skilled 
labour 
Composite Unskilled 
labour 
Skilled workers Semi-skilled workers Low-skilled workers Informal workers 
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force, and using an accumulation equation for capital
12
. Transfers between institutions as 
well as government’s consumption in volume are fixed at the base year and then grow at the 
population rate. We assume that the rest of the world’s savings is a fixed proportion of GDP. 
Given this assumption, we do not allow South Africa to borrow further from the rest of the 
world
13
. 
6. Simulation scenarios 
 
We intend to evaluate the impacts of the world economic crisis on the South African 
economy. As our dynamic CGE model does not take into account financial flows, the 
financial consequences of the crisis cannot be captured directly. However the economic 
consequences of the slowdown of the world economy will be captured through the real side 
of our CGE model. As we know, the main transmission channels of the world crisis to 
developing countries are a decrease in export demand and export prices, a decrease of 
Foreign Direct Investment and a tightening of the capacity to finance a current account 
deficit, a decrease in remittances and a drop of tourism. However, for South Africa, the 
latter two channels are not relevant: South Africa does not receive remittances from abroad, 
and tourism has not decreased
14
. Thus we will focus on the external trade and foreign 
financing of domestic firms. On the positive side a drop in international prices could lead to a 
reduction in import prices and a possible reduction in the cost of imported goods especially 
for imported intermediate and capital goods. This positive impact could be counteracted by 
increased competition by foreign suppliers in sectors competing with imports  
An innovation of our study is that we split the economy in four different groups of activities. 
Each group is defined by its degree of dependency/exposure to the global crisis and will be 
affected differently by the crisis. The four groups are defined as follows (see Table 24 in 
annex) 
o Group 1: Sectors that won’t be affected. We assume that these sectors will face 
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 To specify the accumulation of capital, we follow Jung and Thorbecke (2001) function. 
13
 This assumption can seem weird given that the country has in the past increased their savings from 
abroad. However, South Africa does not want to increase substantially its current level of borrowing. 
14
 In 2009, many sports events were organized in South Africa (Confederation Cup, Lion’s Tour)  
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neither a reduction in the foreign demand nor a reduction in international prices. Basically, 
group 1 refers to gold
15
, food and beverage commodities.  
o Group 2: Sectors weakly affected. They are not heavily dependent on foreign trade 
and not very closely related to other sectors. We will find here commodities such as 
agriculture, clothing and wood. 
o Group 3: Sectors mildly affected. As in sectors in group 2 those sectors are not 
heavily dependent on foreign trade but are closely linked to other sectors. Those sectors will 
react to a reduction in consumption, investment expenditures or reduction in demand for 
intermediate goods. This group refers to most of transports products, trade and 
construction. 
o Group 4: Sectors strongly affected. They are closely linked to the international 
markets either on the export dimension or the import side. Here we find fossil fuel, other 
mining, machinery and equipment. 
Table 6 gives an overview of the South African economy for the different categories 
described above. We report the shares of output, of exports and imports as well as the 
composition of local demand and labour market. Thus, we can point out that mildly affected 
sectors represent around 60% of total output while strongly and mildly affected sectors 
represent respectively 48.2% and 31.8 % of total exports. These two groups together 
represent 80 % of total exports.  
Table 6 : Initial shares in 2005 (% in value) 
 
Commodities/Sectors Total output Exports Imports Local 
demand 
Labour 
demand 
Non affected 6.2 11.0 4.1 5.1 4.7 
Weakly affected 6.2 9.0 8.7 5.7 4.4 
Mildly affected 59.5 31.8 32.4 65.2 55.7 
Strongly affected 17.0 48.2 54.8 11.5 9.0 
All tradable 88.9 100.0 100.0 87.5 73.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note that the non tradable sector, this sector regroups government sectors and water, is not 
                                                           
15
 In our paper, we do not take into account the speculative surge in the demand for gold. This scenario 
will be analysed in a futur work. 
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taken into account and as a result the sum of shares does not add to 100% except, of course, 
in the case of imports and exports. In the same way, we can underline that the non tradable 
sector represents more than 25% of the total wage bill and consequently provides 
employment opportunities to a non negligible part of the population. 
 
In this paper, we simulate the impact of 2 scenarios that are distinguished by the magnitude 
of the recession (severe or moderate). The next set of Tables present the details of the 
proposed scenarios. 
Table 7 : Moderate scenario 
 
Sectors Changes in world prices of 
export and import  
Changes in world demand for 
export.  
Weakly affected 
 
-2% in 2008 and 2009  
Mildly Affected 
 
-3.5% in 2008-2009 and +2.1% 
in 2010 
 
-2% in 2008-2009, and +2.1% in 
2010  
 
Strongly affected -5% in 2008-2009 and +2.1% in 
2010  
 
-2% in 2008-2009, and +2.1% in 
2010  
 
 
Table 8: Severe Scenario: 
 
 Changes in world prices for 
export and import  
Changes in world demand for 
export. 
Weakly affected 
 
-10% in 2008 and 2009  
Mildly Affected 
 
-15% in 2008 and 2009 
 
-10% in 2008-2009, and +1% in 
2010  
 
Strongly affected -20% in 2008 and 2009 -10% in 2008-2009 
 
In terms of the impact of the crisis on Foreign financing of domestic firms, we assume that 
foreign transfers to firms decrease by 5% in 2008-2009 and then increase by 2.1% in 2010 in 
the moderate scenario. In the severe scenario, we assume that it decreases by 10% in 2008-
2009 and then increase by 1% in 2010. This reduction corresponds globally speaking to a 
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tightening of the liquidity available to firms to finance their investment program and has an 
indirect impact on the current account. A reduction in foreign transfers reduces the financial 
resources available to finance imports and will require an increase in exports to compensate 
this reduction. 
After 2010, world prices recover to their BAU values; world demand increases at the 
population rate.  
 
7. Results: 
 
Given the magnitude of the different shocks each scenario will generate differential 
outcomes on industries’ output, the entire price structure and, consequently, factor 
reallocation. However the final impact on households will depend on their factor 
endowments and their sources of income including transfers as well as their consumption 
patterns. These effects are different in the short run compared to the long run and this is 
partly why dynamic analysis is called for. The following sections discuss in detail the impacts 
of the price and demand shocks as they channel through changes in macroeconomic 
variables and the government budget, in activities’ outputs, and the incomes and savings of 
agents (individuals and firms). 
 
1. Impact on prices 
 
The reader will remember that in this CGE model we assume that in order to protect their 
foreign market shares, South African exporters have to adjust their FOB prices taking into 
account the price of competitors and the world elasticity of demand for South African goods. 
Table 9 summarises the impact of the two scenarios on export prices. As can be seen, there 
is a huge decrease in exports prices, following the drop in international prices and demand  
and the decrease is, of course much greater for the severe scenario. If we look carefully at 
the impact of the strongly affected sectors the drop of FOB prices is a little bit less than the 
drop in world export prices (-5% in 2008 and 2009 for world prices and -4% and -2.7% for the 
FOB prices in the moderate scenario) Apparently the South African firms are losing ground 
with respect to their competitors and don’t adjust completely to the new conditions. The 
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same is true for the severe scenario. We will see later that in terms of volume of exports, the 
drop of South African exports is greater than the reduction in the world demand. Note also 
that for non affected sectors, the decrease in FOB prices is essentially due to the decrease in 
the cost of trade and transportation margins. In the two scenarios, world prices of exports 
increase of 2.1% in 2010 and resume their BAU level for the following years (up to 2015). 
This positive impact of world export prices eliminate nearly the preceding drop, but even in 
the long run the FOB prices are still below their BAU level.  
 
Table 9: Impact on export prices (%change from BAU) 
 
  Moderate Severe 
Commodities Initial 
exports 
shares 
2008 2009 2010 2015 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Non affected 11.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.4 -0.3 -3.2 -3.7 -1.4 -1.6 
Weakly 
affected 
9.0 -1.9 -1.7 -0.2 -0.1 -8.5 -8.7 -0.7 -0.5 
Mildly affected 31.8 -3.3 -2.1 -0.5 -0.3 -14.0 -13.9 -2.2 -2.1 
Strongly 
affected 
48.2 -4.0 -2.7 -0.3 -0.3 -16.6 -16.3 -1.6 -1.8 
All 100.0 -3.3 -2.2 -0.4 -0.3 -13.6 -13.5 -1.7 -1.7 
 
Tables 10 and 11 present the impact of the shocks on import prices and local domestic 
prices. The drop of world price of imports will reduce the domestic cost of imported goods 
even if the reduction is, in percentage point, a little bit less than the reduction in world price. 
For the moderate scenario, in 2008, it can be seen that import prices drop more than local 
prices for strongly and mildly affected sectors. We would expect for these sectors an 
increase in imports compared to domestic purchases. The opposite case is found for the 
weakly or non affected sectors. It is important to note for the latter, we have a decrease in 
import prices due to margins. 
Table 10: Impact on import prices (%change from BAU) 
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  Moderate Severe 
Commodities Initial 
imports 
shares 
2008 2009 2010 2015 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Non affected 
4.1 -1.0 -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 -3.9 -3.9 -1.1 -0.7 
Weakly 
affected 
8.7 -2.3 -2.1 -0.2 -0.1 -10.4 -10.4 1.1 -0.5 
Mildly affected 
32.4 -3.4 -1.6 -0.1 -0.1 -14.4 -14.4 -0.5 -0.3 
Strongly 
affected 
54.8 -4.5 -2.8 -0.1 -0.1 -17.8 -17.9 -0.6 -0.4 
All 
100.0 -3.8 -2.3 -0.1 -0.1 -15.5 -15.6 -0.6 -0.4 
 
Table 11: Impact on local demand prices (%change from BAU) 
 
  Moderate Severe 
Commodities 
Initial local 
demand 
shares 
2008 2009 2010 2015 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Non affected 5.1 -2.4 -2.0 -0.7 -0.4 -9.2 -10.0 -3.4 -2.2 
Weakly 
affected 
5.7 -2.4 -2.0 -0.6 -0.4 -9.7 -10.1 -2.8 -2.2 
Mildly 
affected 
65.2 -2.9 -2.3 -0.6 -0.4 -11.6 -11.6 -2.9 -2.3 
Strongly 
affected 
11.5 -3.3 -2.2 -0.3 -0.2 -13.3 -13.0 -1.3 -1.3 
All 100.0 -2.9 -2.3 -0.6 -0.4 -11.2 -11.3 -2.7 -2.3 
 
 
2. Impact on exports, imports and local demand: 
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As expected, results reported in Table 12 show that exports decrease strongly for products 
belonging to group 4, and deeper in the severe scenario. In 2008, at the beginning of the 
crisis, we have a decrease of 21.5% for strongly affected sectors in the severe scenario. The 
drop in world demand has a direct effect on exports and the lower reduction in FOB prices 
with respect to world prices also reduces the performance of exports.  
It’s important here to understand the behavior of the non affected sectors. Globally 
speaking, they benefit from the difference between local prices (that are sharply decreasing 
and export prices (that are hardly affected)). The real exchange rate depreciates strongly 
and this movement favors only the exporting sectors that are not affected by the reduction 
in foreign demand and international prices. For instance, the gold sector belonging to non 
affected sectors sees the volume of its exports increasing by 3.1% in 2008 in the moderate 
scenario and by 10 6% in the severe. 
 
Table 12: Impact on exports (%change from BAU) 
 
  Moderate Severe 
Commodities Initial 
exports 
shares 
2008 2009 2010 2015 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Non affected 11.0 3.3 3.2 1.3 0.9 12.4 13.8 4.7 5.4 
Weakly 9.0 -0.0 -0.6 0.8 0.3 -3.8 -3.2 3.3 2.2 
Mildly 31.8 -2.6 -1.1 -0.5 -0.9 -13.3 -14.6 -4.6 -5.0 
Strongly 48.2 -5.2 -3.9 -0.9 -1.1 -21.5 -23.0 -7.0 -6.8 
All 100.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.4 -0.7 -13.6 -14.5 -4.0 -4.1 
 
From table 13, we also note a sharp decrease in imports. As we will see later total income of 
households will go down substantially (See Table 22) driving a huge reduction in total 
absorption and a reduction of demand for imported goods. In the moderate scenario this 
demand reduction is sufficient to compensate for the positive effect of lower import prices. 
At the end imports fall by 2.1 % in the strongly and mildly affected sectors. However this 
decrease will be greater for non affected and weakly affected sectors as the local price falls 
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more than the import price. We also have to keep in mind that we have a constraint on the 
current account balance which is assumed fixed relative to GDP. This assumption implies 
that if the country’s exports decrease, then its imports would have to follow the same path. 
 
Table 13: Impact on imports (%change from BAU) 
 
  Moderate Severe 
Commodities Initial 
imports 
shares 
2008 2009 2010 2015 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Non affected 
4.1 -2.5 -2.2 -0.8 -0.8 -10.2 -11.1 -4.8 -4.1 
Weakly 
8.7 -2.2 -1.6 -1.0 -1.1 -8.4 -9.3 -6.1 -5.5 
Mildly 
32.4 -2.1 -2.2 -1.0 -1.1 -8.7 -9.6 -5.9 -5.7 
Strongly 54.8 -2.1 -2.0 -1.1 -1.3 -9.3 -10.2 -6.4 -6.4 
All 
100.0 
-2.1 -2.0 -1.0 -1.2 -9.1 -9.9 -6.2 -6.0 
 
As explained previously, the contraction on the demand side translates into fewer imports. 
However as shown in Table 14, this will affect domestic demand even more dramatically due 
to the increased competitiveness of foreign products created by the reduction in import 
prices.  
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Table 14: Impact on local demand (%change from BAU) 
 
  Moderate Severe 
Commodities 
Initial local 
demand 
shares 
2008 2009 2010 2015 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Non affected 5.1 -1.1 -0.8 -0.3 -0.5 -4.8 -5.0 -2.5 -2.6 
Weakly 5.7 -1.6 -1.4 -0.4 -0.7 -7.5 -7.9 -3.1 -3.2 
Mildly 65.2 -2.4 -1.9 -0.8 -1.0 -10.3 -10.2 -5.1 -5.0 
Strongly 11.5 -3.1 -2.4 -0.8 -1.0 -13.0 -14.1 -5.4 -5.2 
All 100.0 -2.4 -1.9 -0.7 -0.9 -10.3 -11.2 -4.9 -4.7 
 
The decrease in the total demand for goods will have consequences for sectoral production. 
We would actually expect sectoral production to decrease, and the decrease should be 
stronger for sectors strongly dependent on exports. On the other hand, sectors that are not 
directly affected by the crisis might be affected by a reduction of other sectors’ demand, in 
terms of intermediate consumption for instance. This is the case for all transport and trade 
sectors. 
 
3. Impact on production: 
The decrease in the production of most of the sectors will have a number of consequences. 
First, firms that see their exports and production fall will retrench workers as they are 
unable to adjust the nominal wage of labour. Thus, we expect labour demand to be reduced. 
We will have to focus on the composition of the labour force for specific sectors to analyse 
which category of workers will be vulnerable. Moreover, we know that firms will decrease 
their labour demand and will simultaneously decrease their demand for intermediate 
consumption given the reduction in the level of activity. Therefore, some sectors (not 
directly influenced) will actually be indirectly affected by the decrease in intermediate 
consumption of the strongly affected sectors. Tables 15 summarises these effects on the 
sectors for the two scenarios. 
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Table 15: Impact on production (%change from BAU) 
 
  Moderate Severe 
Commodities 
Initial output 
shares 
2008 2009 2010 2015 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Non 
affected
16
 
6.2 -0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 
Weakly 6.2 -1.3 -1.2 -0.2 -0.5 -6.8 -7.0 -1.9 -2.1 
Mildly 59.5 -2.4 -1.8 -0.8 -1.0 -10.6 -11.5 -5.1 -5.0 
Strongly 17.0 -3.8 -2.9 -0.9 -1.1 -15.8 -17.1 -6.0 -5.8 
All 100.0 -2.4 -1.9 -0.7 -0.9 -10.7 -11.6 -4.7 -4.7 
 
4. Impact on labour demand, unemployment rates and wages 
 
What is the impact of the crisis on labour demand and unemployment? We have seen so far 
that exports, imports and production are falling. Due to the downward rigidity of nominal 
wages, firms will adjust to the reduction in demand by laying off workers. As unions are 
strong in South Africa, we know that producers will not be able to decrease the wage rate to 
adjust to the falling demand so they will have to retrench more workers. Indeed Table 16 
shows the corresponding declines in labour demand. 
Table 16: Impact on labour demand (%change from BAU) 
 
  Moderate Severe 
Commodities 
Initial labour 
demand 
shares 
2008 2009 2010 2015 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Non affected 4.7 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.7 3.1 2.3 -2.1 3.9 
                                                           
16
 Note here that we have a difference in this group between gold and the rest. Indeed, gold production 
increases. This sector does not depend on local purchases, thus it does not face a decrease in local 
demand. For food and beverage, their production decreases due to the decline in local demand 
(households). 
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Weakly 4.4 -2.4 -2.5 -0.5 -0.5 -12.2 -13.3 -4.7 -2.3 
Mildly 55.7 -5.5 -3.8 -1.0 -0.8 -23.3 -23.9 -8.3 -4.2 
Strongly 9.0 -9.5 -6.1 -0.4 -0.8 -37.3 -36.8 -6.2 -7.8 
All 73.7 -4.7 -3.3 -0.8 -0.7 -20.1 -20.7 -6.8 -3.8 
 
All sectors except the non affected retrench workers. Non affected sectors, and notably the 
gold sector benefit from the crisis. We saw earlier that its production was increasing, and 
this is only possible by increasing the number of workers.  
 
The process of retrenchments will not be uniform across the different labour categories 
(Table 17). Highly skilled workers are the ones who suffer the least from the crisis. Although 
we have important job losses during 2008 and 2009 (and 2010 for severe scenario), we find 
that the economy would rapidly face a shortage of skilled workers. This situation fits 
perfectly with the reality in South Africa. 
Table 17: Impact on total labour demand (%change from BAU) 
 
 High Skilled Skilled and Semi Skilled Low skilled 
YEARS MOD SEV MOD SEV MOD SEV 
2008 -4.40 -20.73 -4.90 -19.57 -5.86 -23.87 
2009 -2.36 -20.82 -3.96 -20.50 -4.23 -24.65 
2010 0 -5.49 -1.33 -7.86 -1.04 -8.24 
2015 0 0 -1.21 -6.59 -0.99 -5.28 
 
In the BAU, for each labour category, we observe that unemployment is decreasing due to 
the fact that capital grows faster than labour, and that labour is more and more efficient in 
the economy. Results reported in Table 18 show that for highly skilled workers only, in the 
base year, the unemployment rate is very low (1%) and actually decreases in the BAU to 
reach 0% in 2007. In 2009, in the severe scenario, for skilled workers, their unemployment 
rate reaches a little more than 20%.  
Table 18: Unemployment rate (%) 
27 
 
 
 High Skilled Skilled and Semi Skilled Low skilled 
YEARS MOD SEV MOD SEV MOD SEV 
2005 1.00 1.00 15.00 15 26.4 26.4 
2008 4.40 20.73 17.18 29.96 28.16 41.90 
2009 2.36 20.82 15.50 30.05 26.07 41.83 
2010 0.0 5.49 12.23 18.04 22.73 28.36 
2015 0.0 0.0 7.02 12.08 18.42 21.96 
 
Recall that there are actually 4 types of labour in the model, the 3 described above and 
informal labour. We assume that we do not have unemployment of informal labour. 
Therefore, the impact of the crisis for this type of labour will be on their wage rate which 
falls sharply.  
 
Table 19: Impact on high skilled and informal wage rate (%) (%change from BAU) 
 
 High Skilled Informal 
YEARS MOD SEV MOD SEV 
2008 1.38 1.38 -5.00 -21.10 
2009 2.48 2.48 -3.68 -21.85 
2010 -1.68 -3.61 -0.97 -7.64 
2015 -1.46 -7.99 -0.77 -4.24 
 
On the rate of return of capital, it is not surprising to see a decrease in most of the sectors as 
depicted in Table 20. Thus, we will expect negative impacts on households’ incomes, and 
even more on firms’ incomes, since they rely mainly on capital. 
Table 20: Impact on rate of return to capital (%change from BAU) 
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  Moderate Severe 
Commodities 
Initial rate of 
return shares 
2008 2009 2010 2015 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Non affected 4.1 -1.3 -1.8 -1.1 -0.3 -4.6 -7.2 -7.0 -1.9 
Weakly 5.3 -1.7 -2.1 -0.7 -0.4 -7.7 -9.0 -4.1 -2.1 
Mildly 71.3 -4.0 -3.1 -0.9 -0.4 -16.0 -15.9 -4.9 -2.7 
Strongly 15.8 -6.2 -3.9 0.0 -0.2 -25.0 -23.1 -0.9 -1.6 
All 100 -4.5 -3.4 -0.8 -0.4 -17.9 -17.8 -4.7 -2.7 
 
Taking these results into account, we can now analyze what happens to the different agents 
following the crisis. 
5. Impact on institutions: 
 Firms: 
As we mentioned previously, the rate of return for capital is sharply decreasing. Firms’ 
income is thus strongly affected as this component represents 88% of their total income 
(Table 21). Moreover, one of the channels through which the crisis operates is modeled as a 
decrease in transfers from abroad. Thus, we expect their income to decrease strongly. Firms’ 
income decreases by 16% in 2008 in the severe scenario, and even in the long run, it cannot 
return to its BAU level. 
Table 21: Impact on firms (%change from BAU) 
 
 Capital income Transfers Income Total Income Savings 
YEARS MOD SEV MOD SEV MOD SEV MOD SEV 
2008 -4.53 -17.94 -1.87 -3.73 -4.23 -16.34 -4.17 -16.06 
2009 -3.72 -18.74 -2.22 -4.06 -3.55 -17.11 -3.52 -16.82 
2010 -1.35 -7.24 -1.83 -4.06 -1.40 -6.89 -1.41 -6.83 
2015 -1,45 -7.66 -1.83 -4.06 -1.49 -7.30 -1.50 -7.24 
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Firms’ savings are obtained after removing taxes to government and transfers paid to other 
institutions (mainly households and the rest of the world) from their income. As seen in 
Table 21, there is a dramatic fall in firms’ saving which is more pronounced in the short run. 
This decrease in firms’ savings will have important consequences for total investment. 
Indeed, firms’ savings represent 80.5% of total investment Here again, we can see that, even 
in the moderate scenario, the effect of the crisis remains in the long run as, firm’s savings 
remains below its BAU level (-1.5%). 
 
 
 Households 
 
Households receive income from labour and transfers from firms, government and the rest 
of the world. We assume that transfers from government and the rest of the world are fixed, 
whereas transfers from firms are a proportion of firms’ income. 
As shown in Table 22, unemployment rises for all labour categories and labour demand 
decreases. As households’ income is mainly based on labour income, we expect it to 
decrease. Moreover, as mentioned previously, firms’ income is decreasing and so are the 
dividends it pays. Thus, households’ income decreases sharply in both scenarios. This 
decrease negatively affects household consumption and savings and thus total absorption 
through a reduction in consumption and investment.  
Table 22: Impact on households (%change from BAU) 
 
 
Labour income Transfers 
Income 
Total Income Savings Consumption 
YEARS MOD SEV MOD SEV MOD SEV MOD SEV MOD SEV 
2008 -5.4 -21.36 -3.43 -13.19 -4.64 -18.24 -4.83 -18.85 -4.62 -18.16 
2009 -4.29 -22.26 -2.90 -13.86 -3.76 -19.04 -3.94 -19.69 -3.74 -18.96 
2010 -1.37 -8.29 -1.17 -5.64 -1.29 -7.27 -1.38 -7.60 -1.28 -7.24 
2015 -1.23 -6.67 -1.26 -6.08 -1,24 -6,44 -1.33 -6.87 -1.23 -6.40 
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 Government: 
Government’s income is expected to decrease. Indeed, direct taxes are decreasing (as a 
share of households and firm income), and taxes on products are also decreasing for most of 
the sectors (decrease in imports, and production). We know that half of government income 
comes from direct taxes, and around a third comes from indirect taxes on products. Thus, 
given the above, we expect its income to decrease. 
Figure 3 represents the variations of the share of Government’s income in GDP as well as 
government’s savings as a percentage of GDP for the BAU and both scenarios. 
Figure 3: Income/GDP and Savings /GDP for government 
 
 
In the BAU, government income/GDP is around 28%. This share increases in the scenarios 
due to the huge drop of GDP. Regarding savings over GDP, in the BAU in 2008, the deficit 
represents 3% of GDP, and without any shock, the deficit would decrease to reach a surplus 
in 2015. Note that in the base year, the deficit is quite low, and then, we have a decrease in 
prices in the BAU (as the economy is becoming more and more efficient through time). It is 
therefore straightforward to understand why government’s savings become positive in the 
long run. 
With the crisis of course, we do not observe the same pattern in the short run. Indeed, the 
deficit reaches -15% of GDP in 2008 and 2009 in the severe scenario, and around 5% for the 
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moderate scenario. In the long run, we find that the situation is improved somewhat but we 
are far behind the BAU situation. 
 
6. Impact on total investment and GDP: 
 
Given all the preceding impacts we are not surprised to observe a huge decrease in total 
investment (Table 23). What is relevant to note here is that even though the crisis is in effect 
only in 2008 and 2009, and the recovery starts in 2010, impacts on investment remain in the 
long run. Indeed, whatever the scenario, in 2015 we observe a decrease in investment. 
Table 23: Impact on investment (in %) (%change from BAU) 
 
 Total investment 
(value) 
Private 
investment(value) 
Private 
investment(volume) 
YEARS MOD SEV MOD SEV MOD SEV 
2008 -6.16 -23.94 -6.00 -23.49 -2.64 -11.20 
2009 -5.03 -24.91 -4.99 -24.54 -2.62 -12.47 
2010 -1.90 -9.61 -1.99 -10.00 -1.57 -8.21 
2015 -1.93 -9.48 -2.03 -9.90 -1.78 -8.48 
 
Now focusing on GDP, we know that the South African projections for GDP were around 
4.5% growth per year. The world economic crisis produces a huge drop in GDP (Figure 4). For 
both scenarios, we can see that GDP falls in 2008 and 2009 and then increases again, but it 
will never reach its BAU value. In other words, without a deliberate government intervention 
to stimulate the economy and counteract the negative impact of the world crisis we will 
never have the same level of GDP as in the BAU scenario. 
Figure 4: Evolution of Real GDP in BAU, Moderate and Severe scenarios 
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8. Concluding remarks: 
 
As expected, the effects of the world economic crisis on the South African economy are 
really harsh even in the moderate scenario. Indeed, the decrease in world prices combined 
with the drop in world demand leads to a fall in production for most sectors. This reduces 
employment and unemployment rates increase. 
The impact on institutions is also worrying. Households see their income drop, and the 
situation is worse for informal workers that do not benefit from minimum wage. They face a 
huge drop in their wage rate. Firms also suffer from the crisis as their income and savings 
decrease strongly. 
A relevant fact to note is that even if the crisis only lasts for two years (2008 and 2009), its 
effects remain even in the long run, notably due to the permanent impact of the drop in 
investment.  
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2 Appendix 
Table 24: Sectors grouped according to severity of the impact of the crisis 
 
Group Sectors Number of 
sectors 
Group 1:  (Non  
affected sectors)  
Gold & uranium ore mining 
Food 
Beverages & tobacco 
3 
Group 2: Sectors 
weakly affected 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
Leather & leather products 
Footwear 
Wood & wood products 
Paper & paper products  
Water supply 
Furniture 
9 
Group 3: Sectors 
mildly affected: 
Building construction 
Electricity, gas & steam 
Basic non-ferrous metals 
Metal products excluding machinery 
Other industries 
Basic chemicals 
 Printing, publishing & recorded media 
Other chemicals & man-made fibres 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Glass & glass products 
Non-metallic minerals 
Wholesale & retail trade  
Catering & accommodation services  
Railway transport 
Road transport 
31 
35 
 
Transport via pipeline 
Water transport  
Air transport  
Transport support services  
Communication  
Finance & insurance 
Business services  
Medical, dental & other health & veterinary 
services 
Community, social & personal services  
Group 4: Sectors 
strongly affected 
Coal mining 
Other mining 
Coke & refined petroleum products 
Basic iron & steel 
Machinery & equipment 
Electrical machinery 
Professional & scientific equipment 
Other transport equipment 
Television, radio & communication equipment 
Motor vehicles, parts & accessories 
10 
 
